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Time and the Static Image 
ROB IN  L E  PO IDEV IK  
I. Introduction 
Photographs, paintings, rigid sculptures: all these provide examples 
of static images. It is true that they change-photographs fade, 
paintings darken and sculptures crumble-but what change they 
undergo (unless very damaging) is irrelevant to their representa- 
tional content. A static image is one that represents by virtue of 
properties which remain largely unchanged throughout its exis- 
tence. Because of this defining feature, according to a long tradition 
in aesthetics, a static image can only represent an instantaneous 
moment, or to be more exact the state of affairs obtaining at that 
moment'. It cannot represent movement and the passage of time. 
This traditional vieu- mirrors a much older one in metaphysics: that 
change is to be conceived of as a series of instantaneous states and 
hence that an interval of time is composed of extensionless 
moments. The metaphysical view has been involved in more con- 
troversy than its aesthetic counterpart. Aristotle identified it as one 
of the premises of Zeno's arrow paradoxZ and Augustine employed 
it in his proof of the unreality of time3. The aesthetic view, for its 
part, was subjected to a blistering attack in Ernst Gombrich's bril- 
liant essay 'Moment and hlovement in Art'", uhich persuasively 
argues, not only against the doctrine that the changeless cannot rep- 
resent change, but also against the very idea of an instant of time. 
Still, Gombrich overstates his case. Is the idea of an instant sim- 
ply a philosophers' fiction? And if u-e allow such an idea into our 
conception of the world, are we thereby committed to a mistaken 
view of pictorial representation? Implicit in Gombrich's argument 
is a link between depiction and perception. But what is this link, 
and what role does it play in the argument? I propose in this essay 
to take another look at the question of what time-span is represent- 
' I shall use 'instant' sometimes as shorthand for 'instantaneous state of 
affairs', and sometimes in the sense of an extensionless moment of time. 
The context should make it clear which sense is intended. 
Physics, Book VI,  239b5-9. 
I Confessions, Book X I ,  15  and 27. 
' Journal of the IVarburg and Courtaztld Institutes XXV I I  (1964), pp. 
293-306. 
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ed by the static image, and consider whether answering this ques- 
tion presupposes a view of time and change. I shall begin with a 
brief resume of Gombrich's discussion. 
11. Gombrich versus the punctum temporis 
The  traditional treatment of static images is well expressed in two 
eighteenth century texts cited by Gombrich. The  first is James 
Harris' Discourse on Music, Painting and Poetry, in which Harris 
writes that each picture is 'of necessity a punctum temporis or 
i n ~ t a n t . ' ~The  second is G.  E. Lessing's Laocoon, which distin- 
guishes between the arts of time and the arts of space. Painting is 
an art of space because it 'can only represent a single moment of an 
a ~ t i o n . ' ~This view, comments Gombrich, 'remained unquestioned 
in aesthetics.' (p. 295) But, he argues, we must give it up if we are 
to understand how the passage of time can be conveyed in paint- 
ings. 
If change is properly thought of as a series of instants, it is cer- 
tainly true that we do not experience it as such. We see a moving 
horse: we do not see the horse occupying different places at differ- 
ent moments, even if that is all that it is doing. How, then, can we 
be sure that we have really captured one of these moments on can- 
vass, rather than present a pure invention? Photography, at least 
when it had developed to the point where only the briefest expo- 
sure was necessary, appeared to provide the answer to this ques- 
tion. The  famous example of this is Eadweard hluybridge's 
demonstration, through taking a number of successive pho-
tographs of galloping horses, that the position of the legs during 
the gallop had been systematically misrepresented by painters. 
This posed a dilemma: should realistic painting aim to imitate 
photography, or is art best served by avoiding photographic real- 
ism? Gombrich's comments on this take us to the heart of his 
argument: 
Do we not beg the most important question when we ask what 
'really happens' at any point of time? JTe therewith assume that 
what Harris called a punctum temporis really exists, or, more rad- 
ically, that what we really perceive is the infinite sequence of 
such static points in time. Once this is conceded the rest follows, 
at least with the demand for mimesis. Static signs, the argument 
runs, can only represent static moments, never movements 
Quoted in Gombrich, op. cit., p. 294. 

"bid. 
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which happen in time. Philosophers are familiar with this prob- 
lem under the name of Zeno's paradox, the demonstration that 
Achilles could never catch up with a tortoise and no arrow could 
ever move. As soon as we assume that there is a fraction of time 
in which there is no movement, movement as such becomes 
inexplicable. 
Logically the idea that there is a 'moment' which has no 
movement and can be seized and fixed in this static form by the 
artist, or for that matter, by the camera, certainly leads to Zeno's 
paradox. Even an instantaneous photograph records the traces 
of movement, a sequence of events, however brief. But the idea 
of the punctum temporis is not only an absurdity logically, it is a 
worse absurdity psychologically. For we are not cameras but 
rather slow registering instruments which cannot take in much 
at a time. Twenty-four successive stills in a second are sufficient 
to give us the illusion of movement in the cinema. We can see 
them only in motion, not as stills. Somewhere along this order 
of magnitude, a fifteenth or a tenth of a second, lies what we 
experience as a moment, something we can just seize in its 
flight. (p. 297) 
The debate between Muybridge and the painters need not, in fact, 
make any reference to the idea of an instant, for we can still ask 
about the relative positions of the horse's legs during a race with- 
out narrowing our inquiry down to a single moment. But our pre- 
sent concern is with three theses which Gombrich wants to reject: 
(1) There exist instants, i.e. moments of time in which no 
change, but only a state of affairs, can obtain. 
(2) We do not perceive change as such, but a sequence of instan- 
taneous states of affairs. 
(3) A static image represents an instantaneous state of affairs. 
What precisely is the connection between these theses? Gombrich 
seems to think that (2) is a natural extension of (1). But it is not. 
(1) is completely independent of (2), and (2) is in fact just wrong, 
as Gombrich's discussion of watching a television programme 
decisively demonstrates: 
When we watch the programme we are, in fact, watching a tiny 
spot of light traversing the screen from side to side. ... At each 
moment of time, therefore, what we really see (if that expression 
had any meaning) would only be one luminous dot. ... Actually 
if we want to pursue this thought to its logical conclusion the 
punctum temporis could not even show us a meaningless dot, for 
light has a frequency. (p. 297) 
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Even breaking down our perception of what is happening on the 
screen into the smallest units, what we see is a picture, and this is 
an event which takes time. So (2) must be rejected. I t  does not fol- 
1 0 1 x 7 ,  however, that perception does not actually consist of a series 
of instantaneous states of our perceptual systems. In fact, if we 
accept ( I ) ,  then, since perception is a form of change, we must 
analyse perception in this way. So perhaps (2) appears to be a nat- 
ural extension of (1) simply because we misconstrue it as a thesis 
about what perception is, as opposed to a thesis about what we 
perceive. 
What of the connection between (1) and (3)? (3) appears to pre- 
suppose ( I ) ,  so any attack on (1) is ipso facto an attack on (3). This, 
at least in part, is Gombrich's argument: instants are a fiction, so 
nothing could count as representing them. But we have to be care- 
ful how we state this. Paintings (though arguably not photographs) 
may represent all kinds of fictions. Gombrich's point, however, is 
that instants are not just contingently non-existent: the idea of 
them is absurd. Well, can pictures represent the absurd? Hogarth's 
False Perspective represents a logically impossible state of affairs, 
but we can interpret it because each component of the picture rep- 
resents something quite coherent. It is only when we put the com- 
ponents together that we realize that the states of affairs they rep- 
resent could not obtain simultaneously. In contrast, if the instant 
is an absurdity, we cannot explain the intelligibility of representa- 
tions of it in such terms. There are constraints on nha t  it is possi- 
ble to represent, at least in pictorial terms. If the idea of an instant 
really does involve absurdity, this is a good reason for thinking 
that no image represents an instant. 
It is possible to discern in Gombrich's remarks an argument 
which runs in the reverse direction: from the rejection of (3) to the 
rejection of (1). If nothing could count as a pictorial representation 
of an instant, then our grasp on the notion of an instant is weak- 
ened. Is this so? If nothing counted as any  kind of representation 
of an instant, then we could not even frame the thought that there 
were instants, since thought is a form of representation. But we 
can represent linguistically what we cannot represent pictorially, 
so it would seem that resolving the aesthetic debate over (3) will 
not take us very much closer to a resolution of the metaphysical 
debate over (1). Perhaps, however, the debates are not that far 
apart. We can attempt to form a description of an instant, but 
there may be hidden contradictions in that description (for exam- 
ple, those unearthed by Zeno). But if we could produce a simple 
representation of an instant in pictorial terms, a peculiarly trans- 
parent form of representation, then our grasp on the idea of an 
Time and the Static Image 
instant would be much more secure. That is, we could appeal to 
static images in articulating the very notion of an instant. 'We all 
know what an instant is: just look at this photograph of a bird in 
flight.' But, according to Gombrich, such an appeal is futile, for 
the apparently instantaneous photograph is not really instanta- 
neous, it 'records the traces of movement, a sequence of events, 
however brief.' Implied here is a causal account of representation: 
the photograph represents whatever external event was the imme- 
diate cause of the photograph's appearance. But if this will do for 
photographs (which is doubtful), it will certainly not do for paint- 
ings, and we need something which approaches an adequate 
account if we are to understand what time-span a painting repre- 
sents. 
This takes us to the connection between (2) and (3). Any plausi- 
ble account of how paintings (and sculptures) represent will make 
some use of the notion of resemblance: a picture of a sheep will 
often look something like a sheep. Now resemblance is a perceptual 
concept, so there will be some connection between what pictures 
represent and the kinds of thing that we perceive, and Gombrich is 
certainly exploiting this connection in his argument against the 
pztnctum temporis. He does not, however, make it explicit what the 
connection is. Once we make it explicit, Fve may be able to see why 
the rejection of (2) leads naturally to the rejection of (3). 
Our reconstruction of Gombrich's argument may be summa- 
rized as follows: 
There is no such thing TTe perceive, not 
as an instant of time instants, but only what 
takes time to occur 
gives some support to the implies that 

view that 

Static images represent 
intervals, not instants, 
of time 
In the next section, I shall examine some reasons for thinking that 
there are logical difficulties with the notion of an instant. Then, in 
section IV, I shall discuss an account of pictorial representation as 
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a way of casting light on the connection between what we perceive 
and what pictures represent. 
111. Two conceptions of the instant 
Even if the idea is ultimately to be rejected, we must have some 
characterization of an instant in order to assess whether or not it 
entails any absurdities. What characterization should we give? 
Gombrich does not provide a formal definition, but one remark is 
suggestive: 
... the instant of which the theoreticians speak, the moment 
when time stands still, is an illicit extrapolation, despite the spe- 
cious plausibility which the snapshot has given to this old idea. 
( P  303) 
The  instant, then, is an extrapolation. But an extrapolation from 
what? On one account, we derive the notion of an instant from a 
process of dividing an interval into smaller and smaller parts. 
Clearly, if time is (as we assume) continuous, this process has no 
end, just as the series 1, '12, I / +  ... has no last member. So if we 
define an instant as the smallest part of an interval, where a part is 
itself defined in terms of dividing that interval, we are talking of 
something that does not exist. The  continuity of time entails that 
there is no smallest part of an interval. If, then, an instant is thus 
extrapolated, it is indeed an illicit extrapolation. 
A quite different conception of an instant does not regard it as a 
part of an interval at all, but as an extensionless boundary between 
two parts of an interval. The  present moment, for example, may 
be thought of as a boundary between past and future. This seems 
to have been Aristotle's 1 ien : 'The now is a link of time ....for it 
links together past and future, since it is a beginning of one and an 
end of another." This is why, presumably, he says that 'Time is 
not composed of indivisible no\\-s." That remark is made in 
response to one of Zeno's paradoxes, and since, as Gombrich 
notes, these put pressure on the notion of an instant, some remarks 
about them are in order. 
Gombrich refers to two of Zeno's paradoxes, the Achilles and 
the Arrow. Lumping them together as he does obscures some 
important differences between them. They illustrate, in fact, the 
difference between the two conceptions of instants presented 
above. Consider the Achilles paradox. Achilles never overtakes his 
Physics ,  Book IV, 222~110. 
'Physics, Book 1-1, 239b9. 
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slower competitor, who has a head start, because by the time 
Achilles has run the initial distance between them, the tortoise has 
moved a little further on. When Achilles has covered this further 
distance, the tortoise will have moved again, by a smaller amount, 
and so on ad infinitum. JVe can thus represent the race as a series 
of smaller and smaller steps, each taking a smaller and smaller 
interval of time. Now if we assume that, for Achilles to overtake 
the tortoise, this series of decreasing intervals must have an end, a 
last instant before the overtaking, then we are in trouble. For, if 
time is continuous, there is no such last moment. Between any 
given moment and the putative moment of overtaking, there is 
always a third. One way of representing the argument is this: built 
into our notion of movement (and change in general) is an assump- 
tion that time is discrete-i.e. composed of indivisible parts. But 
since time is continuous, there cannot be change as we ordinarily 
conceive it. Putting it this way, of course, makes it easier to see 
what strategies one could adopt against the paradox. One is to give 
up the idea that time is continuous. Another, more plausible, line 
tx-ould be to revise the concept of change so that it did not include 
the assumption of discreteness. 
In the Arrow paradox, it is the second conception of an instant 
which is operatingy. The  arrow, says Zeno, is at rest at each 
moment of its flight, and so is at rest throughout the period of its 
flight. Now if 'moment' here meant even an infinitesimal inter- 
val of continuous time, then there would be no justification for 
denying that the arrow moved during that interval. So the 
moment in question must be genuinely extensionless. But now 
Aristotle's observation that time is not composed of such 
moments undermines Zeno's inference from 'The arrow is at 
rest at each moment of its flight' to 'The arrow is at rest 
throughout the period of its flight', for such an inference 
requires moments to be parts of the interval. But that is not the 
end of the matter, for there is a strong intuition which suggests 
that a moving object is in motion at any gicen time during its 
movement. Now if there are instants of time in our second sense, 
and we concede to Zeno that nothing could move in an instant, 
then this intuition is under threat. So we have to distinguish 
between moving in an instant-which is impossible-and mov-
ing at an instant. We then say that an object is in motion at a 
" We could, alternatively, interpret the paradox as based on the 
assumption that time is discrete, so that there are in reality instants in the 
first sense of smallest parts of an interval. Since the idea of discrete time 
is one way of undermining the Achilles, it could be suggested that the 
function of the Arrow is to block this particular move in the dialectic. 
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given instant if the object is in a different position at any instant 
before or after that instant. 
These brief remarks hardly do justice to arguments whose force 
and ingenuity have kept debate alive over centuries, but my pur- 
pose here was simply to bring out the important differences 
between t ~ v o  conceptions of the instant apparently conflated by 
Gombrich. 
Here, then, we have the two objections nhich Gombrich raises 
against the instant. One is that it is an 'illicit extrapolation', the 
other is that it makes movement unintelligible. 1-e can avoid the 
first objection by adopting a conception of instants as extensionless 
rather than as the smallest parts of inter\-als. \Ye run foul of the 
second objection, however, if it turns out that this conception of 
instants is threatened by Zeno's Arrow- paradox. Now although 
giving up the notion of an instant would certainly undermine that 
paradox-for then one could not say that the arrolv is at rest at 
every instant of its flight-this is not the only strategy open to us. 
In fact, kve might turn Gombrich's objection on its head and say 
that motion is unintelligible tinless we introduce the notion of 
instants. For me most naturally characterize motion as the occu- 
pancy of different positions at different times, where times are 
understood as instants. This is a reductionist treatment, in that it 
defines motion in terms of something else. If we reject the notion 
of instants, then lve have to view motion as something irreducible. 
How is this supposed to make it intelligible? I would not want to 
push this last point too far, but I do Lvant to insist that instants cast 
more light on motion than they obscure it. They enable us to 
define motion, and in a way nhich explains both the sense in 
which an arrow is at rest in (though not a t )  every instant of its 
flight, and ~vhy  Zeno's inference from this proposition is falla- 
cious. 
Having arrived at an apparently legitimate conception of an 
instant, let us return to the question of what static images repre- 
sent. 
IV. Time and depiction 
As we observed in section 11, some account of representation is 
necessary if \I-e are to assess the position articulated by Harris and 
Lessing. I want to begin by drawing our attention to an often- 
made distinction between vepvese~ztatiolrand depiction. Depiction is 
just one form of representation. Essentially, depiction is represen- 
tation by means of resemblance. A picture of a sheep depicts a 
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sheep by resembling it (in certain respects). But pictures represent 
more than they depict. In  particular, they may represent aspects of 
time that they are unable to depict. Consider the strip cartoon. A 
sequence of relevantly similar (but also relevantly different) pic- 
tures in a linear sequence may represent the passage of time by 
virtue of the convention that pictures on the right represent events 
which are later than those represented by pictures on the left. 
Thus  temporal order is non-depictively represented by spatial 
order. Film, in contrast, typically depicts temporal order: the tem- 
poral order of the images resembles the temporal order of events 
represented."' 
Now if Gombrich's target is the thesis that static images repre- 
sent (by whatever means one cares to mention) only an instanta- 
neous state of affairs, then it is a relatively easy one to hit. We have 
just mentioned the counterexample of the cartoon strip. Or ,  if the 
thesis is restricted to pictures within a single frame, we could cite 
those futurist paintings where representations of non-simultane- 
ous states are superimposed on each other: Duchamp's Nude 
Descending a Stai~fcase, Balla's Dynamism of a Dog on a Leash, or 
hlalevich's The Knife-Grinder.. A familiar technique in photogra- 
phy is the long exposure photograph, where moving objects appear 
blurred against a clear and therefore static background. All these 
are static representations of motion, and hence of intervals of time. 
But even with more standard means of pictorial representation, 
what is represented may have a much greater time-span than \+hat 
is caught on the canvass. For in interpreting the picture, we may 
fill in moments preceding and succeeding the depicted moment. 
At one level, then, the picture represents by putting us in mind of 
a whole event. 
T o  be worth fighting over, the thesis in contention must surely 
be that static images only depict instants. Since they are static, they 
cannot resemble changes in the world. Futurist paintings tend to 
confirm, rather than disconfirm, this idea. Dynamisnz of a Dog on a 
Leash represents movement precisely by depicting a series of 
instantaneous states. T o  assess this idea properly mre need to exam- 
ine the nature of depiction. 
A plausible account is provided by Gregory Curriel'. X satisfac-
'" See Chapter 3 of Gregory Currie, Irtzage and ~Vfirid: Film, Philosophy 
and Cognitice Science (Cambridge University Press, 1995), for a lucid 
discussion of the ways in which time is represented in pictures and film. 
I '  Currie, op. cit., pp. 79-90. Currie ack~lo~vledges a debt to Flint 
Schier's Deeper into Pictures: An  Essay on Pictorial Representation 
(Cambridge University Press, 1986), which introduces the notions of 
triggering recognition capacities and natural generativity. 
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tory theory of depiction, Currie points out, must explain the sense 
in which pictures are like their objects, when in fact they share so 
few properties with those objects. And, ideally, it should also 
explain the fact that our understanding of pictures is 'naturally 
generative': that is, it should explain why the ability to recognize 
an x entails the ability to recognize a depiction of an x. Both of 
these conditions are satisfied by the following account: an image 
depicts an x by virtue of the fact that it triggers an x-recognition 
capacity in the observer. Thus,  if I am able to recognize a sheep, 
then I will generally be able to recognize a depiction of a sheep, 
since both the sheep and its depiction trigger the same capacity. 
And, although the sheep and depiction may share very feu proper- 
ties, the ones they do share will be precisely those which have that 
effect on me. The  account needs to be tightened up a little, since 
pictures of sheep may fail to trigger a illartian's sheep-recognition 
capacity (for example). IYhether a picture is like its object will 
obviously be relative to the kind of observer one is, but Lve do not 
want to make depiction similarly relative. The  natural adjustment 
to make is to build into the account the idea of a 'normal' observer, 
where 'normal' means having the same perceptual capacities as the 
creator of the depiction. So, an image depicts an x by virtue of the 
fact that it triggers an x-recognition capacity in observers mho 
have the same perceptual capacities as the creator of the depiction. 
This account brings into the open n hat plays such an important 
role in Gombrich's argument, namely the connection between 
depiction and perception. The  central insight of Currie's account 
is the idea that we cannot understand depiction just by comparing 
objects and pictures: they are related to each other by virtue of 
their relation to a perceiver. Perceiving objects and perceiving 
depictions of them have something in common, and this some- 
thing is what explains ho~v  depictions depict. ( I  am not suggesting 
that this is a complete account of depictive representation. Such an 
account might \\ell involve the intentions of the artists, our recog- 
nition of those intentions, and so on. But it is reasonable to regard 
Currie's as a more or less complete account of the depictive aspect 
of pictorial representation.) 
Some accounts of depiction tend focus on the depiction of 
objects, and cannot easily be generalized to account for the depic- 
tion of, for example, properties, relations or states of affairs1'. An 
advantage of Currie's account is that it can be generalized in this 
'' See, for example, the account given by Christopher Peacocke, in 
'Depiction', Philosophical Reeiezc XCVI (1987), pp. 383-410, in which 
depiction is explained in terms of the spatlal properties which the repre- 
sentation has in the visual field. 
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way, for we may appropriately talk in terms of a recognition-
capacity for properties, relations, states of affairs and indeed 
changes in any of these things. 
Now that we have a plausible theory of depiction, we should be 
able to answer the question of what static images depict. But this 
turns out to be not at all a straightforward matter. We seem, in 
fact, to be faced with a dilemma. Suppose we say that static images 
can depict movement. This brings us into conflict with Currie's 
account, for static images surely cannot trigger our capacity to rec- 
ognize movement. If that were so, we would see the image as itself 
moving. With a few interesting exceptions (discussed below) we 
obviously do not see a static image as moving. Suppose, then, that 
we say that static images only depict instants. This too creates 
problems, for it suggests that we have a recognitional capacity for 
instants, and this seems highly dubious. This horn of the dilemma, 
incidentally, allows us to make sense of Gombrich's argument 
from the indisputable fact that we do not perceive instants to the 
proposition that static images do not represent instants. T o  put it 
in the terms we have introduced: if static images depict instants, 
then they trigger the same recognitional capacities as are triggered 
by instants. But instants do not, by themselves, trigger recogni- 
tional capacities, for if they did, we would be able to perceive 
them, and we clearly do not. So static images do not depict 
instants. 
Some static images, such as Bridget Riley's Cataract 3, or Fall 
create the illusion of movement. Can we therefore say that they 
depict movement? That what is being triggered in these cases is 
exactly the same kind of process as goes on when we really do per- 
ceive movement is not an uncontroversial matter. According to 
one hypothesis, such images stimulate the retinal movement-
detector cells as a result of tiny and involuntary movements of the 
eye-ball. But this is not the only view. In the absence of any firm 
intuitions as to whether Fall and similar pictures do in fact depict, 
as opposed to merely represent, movement, we may have to wait 
on the outcome of empirical studies. Such cases are all the more 
complex since, paradoxically, the images appear to move and stay 
still at the same time.I3 But we do not, for the purposes of this 
essay, need to get involved in these issues, since it is quite clear 
that most static images, at least, do not depict movement. 
But if static images depict neither movements nor instants, what 
do they depict? A third possibility is that they depict unchanging 
'' For an accessible discussion of illusory perceptions of movement see 
R. L. Gregory, Eye and Brain (London: FVeidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1966), pp. 99-109, and 133-136. 
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states of affairs, since we certainly do have a recognitional capacity 
for such. We can be aware of absence of movement as well as 
movement. A landscape picture or still life is plausibly regarded as 
depicting such absence of movement. But take a particularly 
dynamic painting such Butler's Charge of the Scots Greys.  The  ele- 
ments represented are clearly in motion. But if we are to say that 
the picture nevertheless depicts an unchanging state of affairs (by 
triggering our recognitional capacity for such) then we have to say 
that the picture represents the horses both as moving and as not 
moving. This is not a satisfactory result. 
At this point, \ve need to introduce a third notion of an instant. 
Consider again the idea that we arrive at the notion of an instant by 
extrapolating from a process of dividing an interval of time into 
smaller and smaller parts. The  mistake made by our first concep- 
tion of an instant was to suppose that there was in reality a smallest 
part of an interval. There is no objection, hokvever, to defining an 
instant as an arbitrarily small part of an interval. Or,  to make it less 
arbitrary, we could define an instant as the smallest perceicable part 
of an interval. This we ma!- call the 'specious instant'. Since the 
specious instant is defined by reference to what we perceive, it does 
not presuppose a particular position vis-a-vis the metaphysical 
debate over instants. That is, contrary to what Hume supposed1+, 
we may allow a minimum duration in experience without allowing 
such a thing in the lvorld. Now \I-e clear1~- have a recognitional 
capacity for specious instants. In the experience of any change lve 
may identify a particularly salient point, such as the moment a 
long-distance runner crosses the finishing line. \Ye might represent 
this as a time-slice of the action, but in fact (since we perceived it) it 
has a non-zero duration. This, then, is what static images are capa- 
ble of depicting: specious instants which are parts of a larger move- 
ment represented by the image. Images can thus represent a move- 
ment by depicting perceptually minimum parts of it. 
The  conclusion of this section, then, is that static images do not 
depict an instant in the sense of an extensionless moment, but the 
possibility remains that they may represent it non-depictively, and 
it is this possibility that I shall explore in the final section. 
V. The punctum temporis vindicated? 
Here is an argument for the existence of instants. Consider two 
objects moving away from each other at a constant velocity. The  
l 4  A Treatise of Human lVatzive, 2nd edition, ed. P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Book I ,  Part 11, sections I and 11. 
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distance between them increases continuously, so that however 
small an interval of time we consider, the distance is greater in the 
second part of that interval than in the first. Now, intuitively, 
there is a time at which the distance between them has a single, 
determinate value. But if this is so then the time in question can 
only be an extensionless instant, for in any extended duration 
(however small) the distance between the objects will not have a 
single value but rather a range of values. 
We can readily adapt this argument to show that static images 
are capable of non-depictively representing an instant, as follows. 
An image of an array of objects depicts certain more or less deter- 
minate spatial relations between objects. Kow, if the depicted 
objects are interpreted as being in continuous motion, then for 
how long do those objects remain in the spatial relations they are 
depicted as being in? The  answer must be that they remain in 
those relations just for an extensionless instant. So static images 
can represent instants. 
\Vhen I say that the image depicts 'certain more or less determi- 
nate spatial relations', I do not, of course, mean to suggest that we 
can read off from the image the precise distances between objects, 
nor that the artist was attempting to represent specific values. 
Such things are irredeemably vague. The  important point is that 
the relations are not depicted as changing, and if they are (by other 
means) represented as changing, then the relations depicted must 
be those which obtain at an instant, and not over a period. 
There is a hidden assumption in the argument for instants 
which, when exposed, makes the argument seem less compelling. 
'The distance between two objects' is an ambiguous notion until we 
specify which parts of the objects we are comparing. In fact, the 
distance will remain vague unless we take it that the distance in 
question is between two spatial points. This is the weak point, for 
anyone who doubts the existence of instants is unlikely to embrace 
an argument which assumes the existence of points. But if we are 
willing to accept the existence of instants, then there is a perfectly 
straightforward sense in which static images represent instants: 
they do so by depicting particular spatial relations between objects. 
I t  is time to draw the threads of this discussion together. I hope 
it is now evident that there is no one answer to the question 'What 
time-span does a static image represent?' But that is not to say that 
the answers are not at all objective. The  temporal extent of what is 
represented may vary with the representational mechanism. Once 
we make it clear with respect to what level of representation the 
question is being posed, it should be possible to give a reasonably 
objective answer. Static images depict what I have called the 'spe- 
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cious instant': the smallest perceivable part of an interval. But 
because many such images make reference to actions and events, 
we naturally take them as representing a much larger time-span. 
Finally, insofar as they depict particular spatial relations amongst 
objects which are interpreted to be in motion, they represent gen- 
uinely extensionless instants. There is no incompatibility between 
these answers. An image may represent both an interval and small- 
er constituents of that interval, precisely because it can represent 
its objects in different ways. 
I hope it is also evident in what ways Gombrich overstates his 
case. The  notion of an instant, when properly characterized, does 
not obviously involve us in logical absurdities, nor does it entail 
dubious theses about perception or depiction. And, having reject- 
ed the idea that static images only represent instants, we do not 
need to accept its contrary, that static images cannot represent 
instants. Whether or not static images really do represent instants, 
however, is something we cannot answer until we have settled 
issues about time and change. And this is one illustration of the 
relevance of metaphysics to aesthetics. 
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